China’s Profits and Losses from Currency Intervention, 1994-2011 by Jin, Hailong & Choi, E. Kwan
Economics Publications Economics
2014
China’s Profits and Losses from Currency
Intervention, 1994-2011
Hailong Jin
Iowa State University, hjin@iastate.edu
E. Kwan Choi
Iowa State University, kchoi@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Growth and Development Commons, International Economics Commons, and the
Other Economics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/110. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
China’s Profits and Losses from Currency Intervention, 1994-2011
Abstract
China's currency policy has been criticized for its apparent pursuit of mercantile advantage by artificially
stimulating exports, with potential adverse effects on other economies. While China's currency policy may
have positive output effects, there may be additional profits or losses. This paper computes the annual and
cumulative accounting profits from currency intervention since 1994 when China began its currency
intervention. It is shown that profits initially were positive but since 2007 China has lost a massive amount
from the currency market.
Keywords
currency intervention, cumulative account profits
Disciplines
Growth and Development | International Economics | Other Economics
Comments
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Hailong Jin and Choi, E. Kwan, “China’s Profits and
Losses from Currency Intervention, 1994-2011,” Pacific Economic Review 19 (2014), 170-83., which has
been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12059. This article may be used for
non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/110
1 
China’s Profits and Losses from Currency Intervention, 
1994-2011 
Hailong Jin and E. Kwan Choi 
Iowa State University 
November 2013 
Abstract 
China’s currency policy has been criticized for its apparent pursuit of mercantile advantage 
by artificially stimulating exports, which potentially have adverse effects on other economies. 
While China’s currency policy may have positive output effects, there may be additional 
profits or losses. This paper computes the annual and cumulative accounting profits from 
currency intervention since 1994 when China began its currency intervention. It is shown that 
profits initially were positive but China since 2007 has lost a massive amount from the 
currency market. 
JEL classification code: F1 
Keywords: currency intervention, cumulative accounting profits 
Hailong Jin: Department of Economics, Texas A&M University-Kingsville, Kingsville, TX 
78363.  Tel: 361-593-2697,  E-mail: hailong.jin@tamuk.edu. 
E. Kwan Choi: Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011. Tel: 515-
294-5999, E-mail:kchoi@iastate.edu.  
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Hailong Jin and Choi, E. Kwan, “China’s Profits and Losses from Currency 
Intervention, 1994-2011,” Pacific Economic Review 19 (2014), 170-83., which has been published in final form at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12059.  This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and 
Conditions for self-archiving
1 
 
China’s Profits and Losses from Currency Intervention, 
1994-2011 
 
 
Abstract 
 
China’s currency policy has been criticized for its apparent pursuit of mercantile advantage 
by artificially stimulating exports, which potentially have adverse effects on other economies. 
While China’s currency policy may have positive output effects, there may be additional 
profits or losses. This paper computes the annual and cumulative accounting profits from 
currency intervention since 1994 when China began its currency intervention. It is shown that 
profits initially were positive but China since 2007 has lost a massive amount from the 
currency market. 
1.  Introduction 
Due to China’s mounting currency reserves since the 1990s, its currency policy has been 
under intense scrutiny. This meteoric rise in China’s cumulative trade surplus has provoked 
much debate concerning China’s currency valuation and misalignment. The common view is 
that “China has intentionally depressed the value of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to 
gain unfair advantages in the global market.” (Cheung, 2012; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004) 
China’s currency policy has been criticized because of its possible adverse consequences on 
other economies. 
 Most major currencies are free-floating vis-à-vis other currencies, except the 
renminbi.
1
  China’s low renminbi policy may stimulate its economy and reduce 
unemployment. For example, Gylfason and Schmid (1983) showed that devaluation has 
positive output effects in a study of ten countries. While currency devaluation raises a 
country’s trade surplus temporarily, reserves cannot grow indefinitely in a stationary 
equilibrium. Since reserves are bought and sold at different exchange rates. Hence, the 
central bank may suffer losses from such intervention. 
 
 Many monetarists suggest that a central bank should make positive profits from 
currency intervention to maintain price stability (e.g., Friedman, 1953). They argue that “the 
central bank has an information advantage over other market participants; it also intervenes 
to straighten out destabilizing behavior such as ‘disorderly markets’” (Sweeney, 1997, pp. 
1668, Taylor, 2005).” Although few governments admit currency intervention is motivated 
by profitability, but it is used as a measure of success. For instance, Leahy (1995) and Fatum 
and Hutchison (2006) analyzed profits of currency intervention by the US and Japan, 
respectively. However, profits and losses from currency intervention by the China’s central 
bank have not received any attention in the literature.  
 
 There are two main differences between speculation by private investors and the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank. First, unlike private speculators, PBC 
simply prints yuan to buy foreign currencies, and hence does not pay interest. Second, no 
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deliverable forward currency market for yuan exists due to its regulated status.
2
 PBC keeps 
track of the fund to purchase foreign currencies.  
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate China’s profits and losses from currency 
intervention since 1994 when China began to merge the exchange rates in the swap market 
and official exchange rates. McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) note that renminbi was 
inconvertible before 1994. Also, China’s trade surplus was negligible in 1994. Thus, we 
choose 1994 as the base year to compute annual and cumulative profits from currency 
intervention. Since the central bank may retain any amounts of foreign exchange reserve in 
any period, we utilize the accounting profit concept from currency intervention in a multi-
period framework (Ghosh, 1997). We demonstrate that while profits from currency 
intervention were positive in the 1990s, China has lost a phenomenal sum since 2007. 
2.  Effects of Yuan Appreciation on China’s Trade Surplus 
 Assume that China is an open Keynesian economy in each period and trades only 
with the United States. Due to price rigidity some unemployment exists in its domestic 
market, and changes in the exchange rate affect its gross domestic product (GDP). Let  
denote the dollar price of yuan and let ( , , *)x P Y  denote China’s export in dollars, where 
P is the price level expressed as yuan per unit of output, and Y* is GDP of the United States. 
China’s GDP, expressed in yuan, is given by: 
  / ,i i i i i i iY C I G x q      
where Y, C, I, G and q are China’s income, domestic consumption, investment, government 
spending and imports, all expressed in yuan. China’s import, ( , , )q P Y , depends on the price 
level, exchange rate and its GDP. China is free to choose its dollar peg . China’s net export 
Si is defined as 
 *( , , ) ( , , ),i i i i i i i iS x P Y q P Y     (1) 
where  * /i i iP P  is the dollar price of yuan, 
*P is the dollar price per unit of output in the 
United States, and iY  and 
*
iY  are China’s GDP measured in yuan and U.S. GDP measured in 
dollars in period i, respectively. China’s trade surplus S is measured in dollars. Since China is 
an open Keynesian economy, a yuan devaluation immediately affects domestic price, 
* /i i iP P  . However, yuan depreciation does not affect U.S. GDP, i.e., 
* *
iY Y . Substituting 
* /i i iP P   into (1), we get 
 * * * * *( / , , ) ( / , , ) ( , , *) ( , , ).i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iS x P Y q P Y X P Y Q P Y            
 Since foreign price is fixed, * *iP P , and P* will be suppressed henceforth. Let 
( , )F d r be capital or financial inflow in dollars, including direct investment, portfolio 
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investment and short-term capital flow, excluding reserve account activities, where d and r 
are domestic and foreign interest rate, respectively. A balance of payments (BP) surplus is 
written as 
 ( , *) ( , ) .i i i i i i iS F X Y Q Y F       (2) 
 We first consider the gains from currency intervention in a two-period framework. In 
a stationary equilibrium reserves cannot grow indefinitely. Thus, we assume a balance of 
payments surplus in one period is offset by a deficit in the next period. Trade surplus arising 
from any currency intervention directly affects aggregate expenditure. We assume that 
currency intervention is not sterilized at all.
3
  Equation (1) implicitly defines the equilibrium 
exchange rate oi  in each period; it is the exchange rate which insures zero balance of 
payments surplus, *( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0i i i iX Y Q Y F d r     .  
 Note that Yi depends on Si and i, i.e., ( , , *).i i i iY Y S Y  Equation (2) implicitly 
defines the exchange rate as a function of trade surplus and U.S. GDP. Thus, the exchange 
rate also may be expressed as a function of balance of payments surplus,  
 ( , *).i i ig S F Y    (3) 
A change in foreign income Y* shifts the trade surplus function. Since Y* is assumed as fixed, 
we may write the exchange rate as: 
 ( ),i i if S F    (4) 
where a trade surplus or deficit is expressed in dollars.  
 
 We now explore the effect of a yuan devaluation from the equilibrium rate on the 
trade balance. Note that a change in the exchange rate affects its imports, which in turn 
affects China’s GDP, and hence we may write  ( ),i i i i iY Y S   . The reduced form of 
China’s import may be written as  ( ) , ( ) .i i i iQ Q Y    Differentiating (2) with respect to  
and suppressing i gives: 
 ,S X Q Q      (5) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Given that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds,
4
 
the trade surplus function is negatively sloped, as shown in Figure 1. This implies 0S   and 
'( ) 0f S  .  
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate and Balance of Payments Surplus 
 In the absence of financial flows, the equilibrium exchange rate is attained where the 
trade surplus function S intersects the vertical line at S = 0. Recall that ( , )F d r  is capital 
inflow. If net capital inflow is positive, it shifts the balance of payments curve, S F , to the 
right, as shown in Figure 1.  
3. Annual Profits from Currency Intervention 
 If China behaves as a price taker in the currency market, an equilibrium exchange rate 
is that which clears the foreign currency market. If China pegs renminbi at a different rate, a 
BP surplus or deficit occurs. For instance, China may choose to devalue yuan below the 
equilibrium and invest the resulting BP surplus in the United States. Nevertheless, reserves 
cannot grow indefinitely in a stationary equilibrium. To consider the benefits of foreign 
investment by currency intervention in a simple model, first consider a two period model. 
China is assumed to incur a trade surplus in the first period, which is invested in dollar assets 
in the United States, and the proceeds are used in the second period. Subsequently, this 
assumption is relaxed for multi-period analyses. 
 Let 1S S  denote China’s trade surplus in the first period. The yuan cost of a trade 
surplus of S dollars is 1/S  , where 1 is the exchange rate in the first period. Trade surplus of 
1S  dollars is invested in US Treasury bills, which grows to 1(1 )S r  at the end of the second 
period, where r is the interest rate on the Treasury bills. The yuan cost of net direct 
investment is 1/F  , which is invested in U.S. Treasury bills. We assume that any foreign 
investment, whether it is portfolio investment or direct investment, is repatriated in the 
second period. Thus, the total amount, ( )(1 )S F r  , is sold in the foreign exchange market 
in the second period, and the revenue in renminbi is   2( ) 1 /S F r   , 
where  2 ( )(1 )f S F r     is the exchange rate in the second period.  
 The total profit realized from currency intervention is: 
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 2 1
( )(1 ) 1 1
( ) ( ) .
( )(1 ) ( )
S F r S F r
S F S F
f S F r f S F

 
    
           
 (6) 
 
In order to consider the benefits from currency intervention for more than two periods, 
we now relax the assumption that the central bank liquidates its currency reserve in any 
period. That is, the central bank may sell some of its reserve, or buy even more. If any 
amount of foreign exchange is retained, it is treated as foreign investment at the current 
pegged rate. Such action, short of liquidation, may contribute to profits or losses in 
subsequent periods.  
 
Annual Accounting Profits 
Let iC  denote the amount of cumulative foreign currency invested in the U.S. 
Treasury bills in period i. Assume that the stock of foreign currency reserve at the beginning 
of period 1 is zero ( 0 0C  ), and hence 1 1 1.C S F   The yuan cost of purchasing C1 dollars 
is 1 1/ .C   Foreign investment of 1C  dollars increases to 1 1(1 ),C r  where ir  is the US interest 
rate in period i. Thus, the accounting profit in the first period, which is to be known in the 
second period, is written as: 
 1 1 11 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 1
( )(1 ) (1 )
( , , , ) .
S F r C r CS F
C r  
   
  
     (7) 
Thus, 1 1 1 2( , , , )S r   is the accounting profit in period 1 obtained by assessing the end-of-
period currency reserve, 1(1 ) ( )(1 ),C r S F r     at the unknown exchange rate in the 
second period, 2. If the central bank liquidates the reserve in the next period, 2 can be 
observed from the trade surplus function. However, the central bank may choose to sell only 
a part of its reserve or buy even more. We assume that the central bank pegs renminbi each 
period, and it does not know at what exchange rate renminibi will be pegged thereafter. Thus, 
in each period, the subsequent exchange rates will be treated as unknown variables.  
In the second period, the cumulative investment in the U.S. Treasury bills is 
2 1 1 2 2(1 )C C r S F    , where S2 and F2 are the additional purchases of dollar assets and 
foreign direct investment in period 2, both of which can be negative. Since the central bank 
holds 2C  in period 2, its yuan cost is 2 2/ .C   The cumulative foreign investment 2C  grows to 
2 2(1 )C r  at the end of the second period, which is to be evaluated at the unknown exchange 
rate, 3. The market value of the current reserve at the end of period 2 is 
 2 2
3
(1 )
.
C r


 
Thus, the accounting profit in the second period is: 
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 2 2 22 2 2 2 3
3 2
(1 )
( , , , ) .
C r C
C r  
 

   (8) 
Similarly, the annual profit in period N is 
 
 
   1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
, , ,
1 (1 )1
.
N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N
N N
N N N N
N N
N N N N
C r S F r C r S F
C r
r r
C C
  
 
 
   
   



 
      
 
     
     
   
 (9) 
It is important to note that if renminbi appreciates too much, the annual profit will be 
negative. Only if 1(1 ) N Nr     , the annual profit will be positive. If renminbi appreciates 
faster than the interest rate, then the annual profit will be negative. 
 
Properties of Annual Accounting Profits 
 From (9), annual accounting profits depend on ,N 1N   and Nr . Differentiating (9) 
with respect to Nr  yields 
 
2
1 1
11 1 1
.N N N NN
N N N N N N N
F r
C
r r r
 
    
      
      
     
  (10) 
Provided that 0,NC  the first term is positive. For the second term, if i  satisfies the 
fundamental martingale property, i.e.,  1 1| , , ,N N NE       then by Jensen’s inequality, 
1
1 1
,N
N N
E
 
 
 
 
and hence 
1
1 1
0.N NN
N N N
r r
E
  
 
   
 
 Since 0,N
N
F
r



the second term on 
the RHS is positive on average. The sign on the RHS is indeterminate.  
Differentiating (9) with respect to N  and 1N  , we get 
 1
2
1
(1 )
0,
( )
N N N N N N
N N N N N
S r C  
    


   
  
 
  (11) 
 
2
1 1
(1 )
0.
( )
N N N
N N
C r
  
 
  

 (12) 
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Thus, as yuan appreciates, other things equal, expected annual profit increases. On the other 
hand, as the future value of yuan rises, current profit declines, because a given amount of 
dollar assets fetches a smaller sum in yuan.  
The elasticity of annual profit with respect to the future exchange rate is: 
 
1
1 1
2
1 1
1
2
1 11
1
(1 )
( )
(1 ) (1 )
.
( ) (1 )(1 )
N
N N N N N
N N N N
N N N N N
N N N NN N N
N
N N
C r
C r r
rr
C

  

   
 
   
 

 
 

 

 
  

 
   
   
 
 
 (13) 
Suppose the interest rate were .1 percent (as in 2011) and yuan were undervalued by 
10 percent. Then a 1 percent yuan appreciation (from  =.9 to .91) reduces profits by  
 
.9 1.001
99.
1.001 .9 .91


  
 
 
Suppose the interest rate is 5 percent and yuan was undervalued by 25 percent. In this 
situation, a 1 percent yuan appreciation (from  = .9 to .91) reduces profit by 27 percent.  
These examples suggest that annual profits from currency intervention are very sensitive to 
exchange rate appreciation, especially when the interest rate is near zero.   
 
Data 
China’s foreign exchange reserve and current account data were obtained from the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
5
 The 1994-2011 yuan-dollar exchange rate data 
are obtained from the World Development Indicators database. To calculate the annual and 
cumulative profits in 2011, the yuan-dollar exchange rate on July 2, 2012 was used as proxy 
for the unknown average exchange rate 2012. Interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills change 
daily, and the currency reserve data are only annual figures. Thus, a sort of annual average 
interest rates is needed to compute annual profits from currency intervention. Six-month 
interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills were used as the annual interest rates.
6
  
Annual Accounting Profits Financial Flow 
Based on Equation (9), we calculated China’s annual profits from currency 
intervention for the period, 1994-2011. The results are listed in Table 1. Goldstein and Lardy 
(2009) noted that before 1985, the swap market was sanctioned by the Chinese government 
to settle trade transactions. They argue that the official yuan-dollar rate was above the 
equilibrium market exchange rate, and was used for intergovernmental transactions. 
Nevertheless, the swap market was helpful to the Chinese government for settling trade 
transactions at the equilibrium exchange rate. They argued that “the official exchange rate 
during mid-1990s was probably a reasonable approximation of an equilibrium rate (pp. 6).”  
 8 
Also, the method of computing the foreign exchange reserve was changed in 1992 to 
exclude foreign exchange deposits of state-owned entities with Bank of China. Thus, it 
would be necessary to choose a base year after 1992. The current account surplus was only 
about $5 billion in 1992, and the current account deficit was about $12 billion in 1993. Few 
economists argue that China’s intervention started before 1993. Thus, the period 1993-1994 
may be the time in which China refrained from currency intervention. Accordingly, profits 
and losses from subsequent attempts to moderate exchange rate changes can be computed 
from 1994.  
 Table 1 shows annual profits in yuan from currency intervention, which rose to 81 
billion yuan in 2000, equal to approximately 1/10 of 1 percent of U.S. GDP, but fell to zero 
in 2006. Since 2006, China began to incur huge losses, which rose to 546 billion yuan in 
2007, 843 billion yuan ($125 billion) in 2010, and 447 billion yuan ($69 billion) in 2011. 
This amount should be compared to the actual current account surplus of $202 billion in 
2011. 
Table 1. China’s Annual Profits from Currency Intervention, 1994-2011 
 
  
Exchange Rate  
($/RMB) 
Interest Rate 
(%) 
China FX 
($Billion) 
Annual Profit 
(Billion Yuan) 
1994 0.116 4.64 52.9 6 
1995 0.1198 5.56 75.4 32.2 
1996 0.1203 5.08 107 42.9 
1997 0.1206 5.18 142.8 59.3 
1998 0.1208 4.83 149.2 59.7 
1999 0.1208 4.75 146.2 57.5 
2000 0.1208 5.9 165.6 80.9 
2001 0.1208 3.34 212.2 58.7 
2002 0.1208 1.68 286.4 39.8 
2003 0.1208 1.05 403.3 35.1 
2004 0.1208 1.58 609.9 29.3 
2005 0.122 3.39 818.9 39.4 
2006 0.1254 4.81 1066.3 2.1 
2007 0.1314 4.44 1528.2 -546.4 
2008 0.144 1.62 1946 -6.2 
2009 0.1464 0.28 2399.2 -98.8 
2010 0.1477 0.2 2847.3 -843.0 
2011 0.1548 0.1 3181.1 -447.2 
2012 0.1584      
 
Annual Accounting Profits without Financial Flow 
 
Financial flows are made to take advantage of different interest rates between countries. The 
presence of the financial flows indicates that there are temporary differences in the financial 
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returns or profitability of investment between the two economies. If no financial flow occurs, 
i.e., 0iF  , for all i = 1, …, N, then equation (9) reduces to: 
   11
1
(1 )
, , , .S S N N NN N N N N N
N N
r
C r C
 
  
 



  
  
 
 (14) 
where SNC  denotes China’s FX caused by trade surplus and is estimated by: 
1 1(1 ) ,
S
N N N NC C r S     given C1993 = 0. 
Table 2 shows that the annual accounting profits without the financial flow also were 
near zero in 2006, and have since decreased to: -641 billion yuan in 2010. This is somewhat 
less than -843 billion yuan when the financial flow is included. As expected, if the interest 
rate differential is negligible, accounting profits should be roughly equal, whether financial 
flows are included or not. 
 
Table 2. China’s Annual Profits from Currency Intervention without Financial Flow,  
1994-2010 
  
Current Account  
($ Billion) 
Estimated FX  
($ Billion) 
Annual Profit 
(Billion Yuan) 
1994 7.7 7.7 0.9 
1995 1.6 9.6 4.1 
1996 7.2 17.4 7.0 
1997 37.0 55.3 23.0 
1998 31.5 89.6 35.8 
1999 21.1 115 45.2 
2000 20.5 141 68.9 
2001 17.4 166.7 46.1 
2002 35.4 207.7 28.9 
2003 45.9 257.1 22.3 
2004 68.7 328.5 15.8 
2005 134.1 467.7 22.5 
2006 232.7 716.3 1.4 
2007 354.0 1,104.8 -395.0 
2008 412.4 1,566.2 -5.0 
2009 261.1 1,852.7 -76.3 
2010 305.4 2,163.3 -640.5 
2011 201.7 2,369.3 -333.1 
 
4. Cumulative Profits from Currency Intervention 
In each period, the currency reserve is evaluated at the official exchange rate. Thus, 
the yuan value of the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in period 2 is 
 10 
2 1 1 2 2
2 2
(1 )
.
C C r S F
 
  
  Note that if China were to liquidate its currency reserve, then 
2 2 ( )(1 )S F S F r     and the cumulative currency reserve at the end of period 2 reduces 
to 2 0.C   The total yuan cost of the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in period 2 is: 
2 2 1 1
2
2 1
S F S F
T
 
 
  . 
PBC, as China’s central bank, does not pay interest. Unlike private speculators, PBC 
simply prints yuan to buy foreign currencies.
7
 No deliverable forward currency market for 
yuan exists due to its regulated status.  
Since China holds on to some currency reserve and does not necessarily liquidate it 
each period, we may consider the cumulative accounting profit which is obtained by 
assessing the value of currency reserves at the current pegged rate each period. The currency 
reserve is treated as the bank’s investment in dollar assets made during the current period, 
and should be separated from current profits. 
Cumulative Accounting Profit to be realized in period 2 is defined as: 
 2 2 2 2 1 12
3 2 1
(1 )
.
C r S F S F
  
   
    
 
 (15) 
Note however, that the exchange rate 2 depends on C2, and liquidation of the foreign 
exchange reserve will lower 2 below the rate that would prevail if it is retained.  If the 
country liquidates its foreign exchange reserve in the second period, 
then 2 2 1 1( )(1 )S F S F r      and 2 0C  , and equation (15) reduces to (6), and the 
accounting profit reduces to the actual or realized profit, 
 1 1 1 1 11
2 1
( )(1 )
.
S F r S F
 
  
    (16) 
Market Value of Foreign Exchange Reserve 
If the country does not liquidate the existing foreign exchange reserve in period 2, its 
cumulative reserve balance is 
 2 1 1 2 2(1 ) ,C C r S F     
and the value of the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in yuan at the end of period 2 
grows to 2 2 3(1 ) / .C r   Note that cumulative investment of 3C  dollars grows to 3 3(1 ),C r  
and its market value is: 3 3
4
(1 )
,
C r


which is known in period 4. Likewise, the total yuan 
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revenue that would be obtained from liquidating the cumulative foreign exchange reserve at 
the terminal period N is:  
 
1
(1 )
.N N
N
C r
 

 (17) 
Cumulative Accounting Profits  
The cumulative yuan cost of foreign exchange reserve in period 3 is: 
3
3
1
.i i
i i
S F
F


  
Thus, the cumulative accounting profit in yuan is: 
 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 13
4 3 2 1
(1 )
.
C r S F S F S F
   
    
     
 
 (18) 
Likewise, the total yuan cost up to the terminal period N is:  
 
1
.
N
i i
N
i i
S F
F


  (19) 
Cumulative accounting profit in period N is the market value of the currency reserve less cost, 
i.e., 
 
11
(1 )
.
N
N N i i
N
iN i
C r S F
 
 
    (20) 
Note that the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in any period can be obtained by 
adding the new trade surplus to the cumulative reserve at the end of the previous period. 
However, in practice, the reported cumulative reserves generally deviate from these derived 
cumulative reserves.  
We now consider an alternative method to compute the cumulative accounting profit, 
which is obtained by adding annual accounting profits. Note that 2 1 1 2 2(1 )C C r S F    . 
Thus, 2 2 2 1 1(1 ).S F C C r     Likewise,  1 1(1 ),N N N N NS F C C r      N > 1, and 
1 1 1.S F C   Thus, we have 
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11
1 1 1 2 2 2
2 1 3 2
1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
...
.
N
N N i i
N
iN i
N
i
i
C r S F
C r C C r C
 
   



 
  
 
    



 
That is, the cumulative accounting profit in each period can be obtained by adding up the 
annual accounting profits. This method is used in Table 3 to compute the cumulative 
accounting profits.  
Differentiating (20) with respect to N gives 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2
1
1
2
1
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ( )
(1 )
0.
( )
N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N
N N N N
S r C C r
S r S F
   
       
 
   
   



      
    
   
   
  

 (21) 
and  from  (11) and (12), we also have 
1 1
0.N N
N N

  
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 displays the cumulative accounting profits since 1994. It shows that in the 
early years of currency intervention, cumulative profits in yuan from currency intervention 
steadily increased, reaching 543 billion yuan in 2006. PBC began to lose money in 2007 
when its cumulative profit was completely wiped out. It has since found it difficult to recover 
from the mounting losses, which reached 1,399 billion yuan (or about $217 billion) in 2011, 
and are expected to rise further as the yuan appreciates. In 2011, the cumulative accounting 
loss rose to 1,128 billion yuan, or close to $179 billion without the financial flow. Again, 
inclusion of the financial flow does not make much difference in the cumulative accounting 
profits. 
 
Table 3. China’s Cumulative Profits from Currency Intervention (billion yuan), 1994-2011 
  With Financial Inflow Without Financial Inflow 
1994 6.0 0.9 
1995 38.3 5.0 
1996 81.1 12.0 
1997 140.4 34.9 
1998 200.0 70.7 
1999 257.5 115.9 
2000 338.4 184.8 
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2001 397.1 230.9 
2002 436.9 259.8 
2003 472.0 282.1 
2004 501.3 297.9 
2005 540.7 320.4 
2006 542.7 321.8 
2007 -3.7 -73.2 
2008 -9.9 -78.2 
2009 -108.7 -154.5 
2010 -951.6 -794.9 
2011 -1398.8 -1128.0 
 
 
 In addition to the speculative profits, China’s central bank could also have earned 
profits or incurred losses from sterilizing the incoming and outgoing money flow. A trade 
surplus in any period increases the money supply when it is converted into renminbi.  PBOC 
can offset this money flow by buying it back through open market operations at the domestic 
interest rate.  When China has a trade deficit, it reduces the money supply, which can also be 
sterilized by a reverse transaction in the open market.  Since China’s interest rates change 
over time,  PBOC may earn profits or incur losses from sterilization efforts.  
 
The extent of PBOC’s sterilization is not revealed to the public. However, it is 
possible to compute the annual and cumulative sterilization profits, using the average 
domestic interest rates each year under various scenarios. When trade deficits and surpluses 
are completely or 100% sterilized, the cumulative profits in 2011 would have been – 5,052.6 
billion RMB (or -$781.1 billion). Alternatively,  when trade surpluses and deficits are 
sterilized by 50%, then the cumulative profits in 2011 would have reduced to -3,225.7 billion 
RMB (or -$498.7 billion). Thus, any effort to sterilize the trade imbalances would have 
further increased the losses from the intervention efforts. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 Throughout the 1990s, China’s profits from currency markets were negligible and 
China did not intentionally speculate in the currency market. In 1994, China merged the 
official and swap markets, effectively adopting the exchange rates from the swap market. 
Initially, the exchange rate rose to the equilibrium level. However, after 1994, the currency 
peg apparently was below the equilibrium level and China began to accumulate trade 
surpluses. Such intervention yielded profits until 2006, but the continued appreciation of the 
yuan resulted in the ballooning of the cumulative losses. This result does not change whether 
or not the financial flow is included. 
 
 The cumulative profits of about 543 billion yuan in 2006 were wiped out completely 
the next year, and the mounting losses from currency intervention rose to 1,399 billion yuan 
in 2011. Current account surpluses since 2007 hovered around $300 billion, and are expected 
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to be above this level, despite the continued appreciation of yuan. If this trend continues, 
China’s losses will continue to mount.  
 
 The primary intent of currency intervention may be to stimulate outputs and exports. 
Nevertheless, PBC may earn profits or incur losses from such intervention attempts. Thus, 
any benefits from expanded exports should be weighed against the possible losses from 
currency intervention.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 Unlike Japan, China does not allow its citizens to invest in dollar assets. 
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2
 Because of recent internationalization attempts, China is allowing the offshore market for 
the RMB-denominated assets. Also, nondeliverable forwards (NDFs) exist in yuan. However, 
not all non-convertible currencies have a NDF market, which exists in some countries where 
forward foreign exchange trading is banned by the government. 
3
 Complete nonsterilization implies that the money supply has increased with the increase in 
foreign exchange reserves. Since the model assumes a Keynesian open economy, an increase 
in money supply has no effect on the economy-wide inflation rate. In practice, the increases 
in foreign exchange reserves in China has been largely offset by increases in central bank 
issued paper and required reserves. Ma, Yan and Liu (2011) note that increasing reserve 
requirement is typically a lost-cost option “because the central banks pay little or not 
interest,” but “below-market remuneration on required reserves acts as a tax on domestic 
banks.” See also Filardo and Yetman (2012). 
4
 China’s trade surplus in dollars decreases as yuan appreciates if 1,X Q    where 
 / ( / )X X X     and  / ( / )Q Q Q       denote elasticity of exports and imports 
with respect to the exchange rate . It can be shown that China’s trade surplus in yuan also 
decreases under the same condition. 
5
 This data excludes gold from the international reserve assets. 
6
 Interest rate data on the 1-year Treasury bills were not available in certain years. 
7
 This constitutes an increase in money supply to affect the yuan-dollar exchange rate. PBC 
issues a certain amount of new money each year. Some of it is used to buy foreign exchange 
from commercial banks, and is called the “Funds outstanding for foreign exchange” by PBC. 
